Donn's websites for ClayResearch brief
Published May 30, 2026
Hermes Agent × MCP catalog

Useful tools, real risk surface.

Hermes Agent’s MCP support is robust: native stdio/HTTP servers, OAuth, catalog installs, per-tool filtering, and sampling controls. The official catalog is still small, but MCP’s broader ecosystem is moving fast — and the security model requires treating every server like executable code plus a prompt-injection surface.

01 / Catalog reality

Hermes has native MCP support and a reviewed catalog, but the official catalog is early.

What Hermes supports

Hermes connects to MCP servers at startup, discovers tools, and registers them as first-class Hermes tools with names like mcp_server_tool. It supports local stdio servers and remote HTTP/StreamableHTTP servers.

  • Interactive picker: hermes mcp or hermes mcp picker.
  • Scriptable catalog listing: hermes mcp catalog.
  • Catalog install: hermes mcp install <name>.
  • Custom add: hermes mcp add <name> --url ... or --command ....
  • Tool selection: hermes mcp configure <name>.

What the official catalog contained in the checked snapshot

The official Hermes docs point to repo manifests under optional-mcps/ as the reviewed catalog. The fetched snapshot showed two catalog entries:

  • Linear — remote HTTP/OAuth workflow integration for issues and project management.
  • n8n — stdio bridge for inspecting and managing n8n workflows.

Caveat: this is a fast-moving catalog; the page should be treated as a dated snapshot, not a permanent inventory.

Translation: Hermes’ MCP implementation is broader than the catalog. The catalog is the reviewed on-ramp; manual MCP configuration is how users connect the wider ecosystem.
02 / Safety model

MCP safety is both software supply-chain safety and prompt-injection safety.

Prompt injection before tool use

MCP tools expose names, descriptions, resources, and prompts to the model. A malicious server can hide instructions in those descriptions, influencing the agent before the user intentionally calls that tool.

Tool poisoning and shadowing

One malicious MCP can try to shape how the model uses other tools, e.g. by telling it to exfiltrate secrets through a trusted-looking workflow or to prefer the malicious tool.

Executable third-party code

Local stdio MCPs may run npx, uvx, bootstrap scripts, package installs, or cloned repo code. That is not just “configuration”; it is code execution.

Controls

Hermes has useful guardrails, but they work best with least privilege.

Risk
Hermes control
Best practice
Credential leakage
Filtered stdio environment; only safe baseline env vars plus explicitly configured env are passed.
Give each server only the one token/scope it needs; rotate and revoke aggressively.
Oversized tool surface
tools.include, tools.exclude, and toggles for resources/prompts.
Expose the smallest practical tool set. Default to allowlists for untrusted or powerful servers.
Prompt/resource injection
Tool-selection UI and server-level config; Hermes also documents prompt-injection/security scanning outside MCP.
Disable prompt/resource wrappers unless needed; inspect tool descriptions and upstream source.
Server-initiated LLM calls
Per-server sampling config: enable/disable, token caps, timeouts, rate limits, model allowlists, max tool rounds.
Set sampling: { enabled: false } for untrusted servers.
Remote MCP trust
HTTP headers/OAuth/TLS options and token storage under ~/.hermes/mcp-tokens/.
Treat remote MCPs like vendors with access to sensitive workflow context.
04 / Recommendations

A safe default policy for Clay’s Hermes setup.

Green-light candidates

  • Linear catalog MCP if project-management loops matter and OAuth scopes are narrow.
  • n8n catalog MCP if automations are already managed in n8n and workflow visibility is valuable.
  • Context7 for coding help, after source review and tool allowlisting.
  • Project-scoped filesystem/Git only when scoped to a single repo directory, never all of $HOME.

Use with extra caution

  • Browser automation MCPs because prompt injection from websites can blend with active sessions and forms.
  • Remote managed hubs because they centralize auth and can touch many services.
  • Workspace/chat MCPs because they can read sensitive docs/messages or post externally.
  • Database MCPs because query tools can expose production data or mutate records.
Operational rule: Every MCP install should have an owner, a stated purpose, a scoped credential, an exposed-tool allowlist, and a rollback/removal path.
mcp_servers:
  example:
    command: "npx"
    args: ["-y", "trusted-mcp-package"]
    tools:
      include: ["safe_read_only_tool"]
      resources: false
      prompts: false
    sampling:
      enabled: false
05 / Sources

Primary sources and research trail.

Research note: I also attempted to launch a separate cheap open-model reviewer via OpenRouter openai/gpt-oss-20b, but this environment had no OpenRouter API key configured. The completed research used isolated Hermes subagents plus Grok/X Search for X signal.